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THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONUNDRUM*
Leonard Orland** and Sue L. Wise***
I.

INTRODUCTION: FAILED IMMUNITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEMS

The great French historian Fernand Braudel reminds us that for
several centuries, plague, "[1]eader of the dance of Death,

.

. was a

fixture, a permanent structure in men's lives." ' Plague was "only one
disease among many others" 2 - smallpox, influenza, typhus, diphtheria, typhoid, tuberculosis and syphilis. While reactions to disease
vary, nevertheless these pestilences "present the same drama, list the
same more or less effective measures (quarantines, surveillance,...
disinfection, roadblocks, close confinement . . . ), the same panic-

stricken suspicions and the same social pattern."' In the midst of
epidemic, the masses die, the "plague making us cruel, as doggs, one
to another," as Samuel Pepys noted in August, 1665. 4
As for the rule of law, Braudel observes that "[M]unicipal mag* COPYRIGHT © 1986 by Leonard Orland and Sue L. Wise. All rights reserved. We
acknowledge the informed and intelligent assistance of Anna Martin-Tsoupas in the
preparation of this essay and the professionalism and patience of Delia Roy, who retyped
numerous drafts of this essay.
** Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A., Rutgers University
1957; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School 1960.
*** Member of the Connecticut Bar. B.A., Simmons College 1965; J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law 1973.
1. F. BRAUDEL, THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE: THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE 78
(1981).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 85.
4. Id. (quoting Samuel Pepys).
Diseases appear and alternately establish themselves or retreat.. .. In fact, these
virulent attacks and retreats might have originated from the fact that humanity had
lived behind barriers for so long, dispersed, . . . so that the exchange of contagious
germs between one group and another led to catastrophic surprise attacks, depending on the extent to which each had its own habits, resistance or weakness in relation to the pathogenic agent concerned.
Id. at 88.
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istrates, officers and prelates forgot their responsibilities; in France
whole parlements emigrated . . . ; [w]hen plague broke out in
London in 1664 the Court left' 5the town for Oxford. . . ; [t]here was

no litigation in the capital[.]
In this present post-penicillin era, we may be witnessing the beginning of such an epidemic. In less than a decade, life has become
nasty, brutish and short6 for tens of thousands of American citizens
whose biological immune systems have failed.7 This biological collapse is the consequence of AIDS, "an entirely new, transmissible,
always fatal and, thus far medically uncontrollable pathological
condition." 8
For most of these citizens, gay men afflicted with AIDS, the
horrors of life multiply logarithmically. Not only do they watch helplessly as their own bodies and those of their intimates rapidly deteriorate toward inevitable death,9 but they also find themselves cut off
from much of what American citizens have come to expect - reasonable employment, housing, medical care, social interaction in a
free environment, life and medical insurance, and, in the end, the
hope of death with dignity. 10
Gay men, already accustomed to a legacy of social and legal
persecution, discover that the failure of their own immune systems
mirrors the failure of the legal and constitutional system expected to
protect them in time of crisis. 1 The sad reality, explored briefly in
this essay, is that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights offer as
little protection to these citizens as their lost physical immunity.' 2
The inadequate constitutional responses to the threat of AIDS find
their roots in the historic oppression of homosexuals and in the uncertainty of current medical knowledge about AIDS.
5. Id. at 85-86.
6. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1960)("the life of man [is] solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish and short").
7. See Krim, AIDS: The Challenge to Science and Medicine, in AIDS: THE EMERGING
ETHICAL DILEMMAS, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 2, 3 (special supplement) (noting
the number of reported and predicted AIDS cases). See also Landsman, Ginsburg & Weiss,
Special Report: The AIDS Epidemic, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 521 (1985).
8. Krim, supra note.7, at 2.
9. See generally J. SLAFF & J. BRUBAKER, THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: How YOU CAN PROTECT YOURSELF AND YOUR FAMILY-WHY You MUST (1985).
10. See generally D. ALTMAN. AIDS IN THE MIND OF AMERICA (1986). See also
Shipp, Physical Suffering Is Not the Only Pain That AIDS Can Inflict, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1986 at A8, col. 1.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 85-133.
12. Id.
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II.

A

CONUNDRUM

LEGACY OF LEGAL OPPRESSION

The current medical literature identifies gay men and drug addicts as high risk AIDS carriers.13 The association of the disease
with gay men and the concomittant perception of AIDS as a gay
disease are new and powerful forces in the stigmatization of homosexuals.' Indeed, long before the AIDS epidemic,'5 homosexuals
had been adjudged morally and socially loathesome and traditional
targets for criminal prosecution.' 6
Criminal prosecution of men for private, nonassaultive, consensual homosexual conduct is of ancient origin;' 7 for centuries, hatred
of homosexuals has been translated into criminal statutes which condemn "the abominable and detestable crime against nature," 18
which was "'felony by the ancient common law, and punished, according to some authors, with burning; according to others . . . with
burying alive.' "19
In the fourth century Christian Roman Empire, anal sex was
13. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 35 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17, 18 (Jan. 17, 1986) [hereinafter cited as AIDS Update 1986];
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Update - United States, 32 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 309 (June 24, 1983) [hereinafter cited as AIDS Update 1983].
14. See D. ALTMAN, supra note 10, at 58-59. See also infra text accompanying notes
85-87 (discussing public reactions to the disease and its association with homosexuals).
15. See Landsman, Ginsburg & Weiss, supra note 7.
16. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST. HOMOSEXUALITY AND CRIME 866-71 (1983).
Addicts experienced a similar fate, culminating with the Harrison Act of 1914, Ch. 1, 38
Stat. 785. By the end of the nineteenth century, addicts had been
identified with foreign groups and internal minorities who were already actively
feared and the objects of elaborate and massive social and legal restraints. Two
repressed groups which were associated with the use of certain drugs were the Chinese and the Negroes. . . . At first [after 1870], the Chinese represented only one
more group brought in to help build the railroads, but particularly after economic
depression made them a labor surplus and a threat to American citizens, many
forms of antagonism arose to drive them out or at least to isolate them. Along with
this prejudice came a fear of opium smoking as one of the ways in which the Chinese were supposed to undermine American society.
Cocaine was especially feared in the South by 1900 because of its euphoric and
stimulating properties. The South feared that Negro cocaine users might become
oblivious to their prescribed bounds and attack white society . . . . When opiates
began to be feared for their addictive properties, morphine was more closely attached to the 'lower classes' or the 'underworld,' but without greater specificity.
D. MusTo, THE AMERICAN DISEASE 5-6 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
17. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST., supra note 16, at 866.
18. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 51 (1975) (per curiam) (tracing common law condemnation of homosexuality).
19. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 n.3 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting I W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 9 (6th ed. 1787)).
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outlawed by the three emperors, reigning jointly.2o By the early Middle Ages,
all non-heterosexual behavior was considered contra naturam

('against nature') . . . .Under the Church's influence in the thirteenth century . ..more anti-homosexual laws were enacted. St.
Thomas Aquinas argued that homosexuality is 'against nature', a
view that, in conjunction with translations of Scripture that emphaunderpins religious and legal sancsize anti-homosexual bias, still
21
tions against homosexuality.

To this day, these historic prejudices provide support for religious and legal sanctions against homosexual behavior. 22 For the
past several hundred years, criminal prosecution of homosexuals has
continued, 23 notwithstanding the relatively recent conclusions of eminent law reform groups in the United Kingdom 24 and the United
States25 that consensual homosexual conduct should not be criminal.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional
right to sexual privacy,26 that privacy has been and continues to be
the exclusive right of heterosexuals, 7 and constitutional attacks on
"crime against nature" statutes have consistently failed in the Supreme Court.

In 1973, the Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, reversed the Fifth Circuit, which had found the Florida "crime against
nature" statute unconstitutionally vague.28 The Court concluded that
20. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST., supra note 16, at 866.
21. Id.
22. Id. See infra text at notes 31-32. But see Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2855 (1986) (footnote omitted):
Thus, far from buttressing his case, petitioner's invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St.
Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status during the middle ages undermines
his suggestion that [the Georgia sodomy statute] represents a legitimate use of secular coercive power. A State can no more punish private behavior because of religious
intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.
23. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST., supra note 16, at 868.
24. Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution Presented to
Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for
Scotland by Command of Her Majesty Sept. 1957 (Commd. 247) (Wolfenden Report).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 commentary at 362-63, 366-67 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1962). ,
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), afid,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
28. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973). While the Supreme Court tersely noted
that "Stone was convicted for copulation per os and per anum, [and] Huffman for copulation
per anum," id. at 22, a careful review of the reported decisions fails to disclose the specific
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"copulation per os and per anum" had "long been held" by the Florida courts to come within the statutory prohibition against the
"abominable and detestable crime against nature" and hence "afforded appellees ample notice that their conduct was prohibited by
law." 29 Two years later, in 1975, in upholding a conviction involving
heterosexual sexual assault (forcible cunnilingus), the Supreme
Court rejected a void for vagueness challenge to Tennessee's "crime
against nature" statute.3 0 The Court declared that "[t]he phrase has
been in use among English speaking people for many centuries,...
and a substantial number of jurisdictions in this country continue to
utilize it."' 1 The following year, the Supreme Court, without opinion, affirmed a three judge court's decision upholding Virginia's
"crime against nature" statute as applied to private consensual homosexual relations. 2
The refusal of the Supreme Court to extend constitutional protection -

the fundamental right of sexual privacy -

to homosexu-

als, while at the same time upholding a state prohibition on acts of
private consensual sodomy, all too clearly demonstrates the continued Supreme Court antipathy toward homosexual conduct. Continuing an unbroken line of cases rejecting constitutional claims tendered
by homosexuals, the Supreme Court, in its 1986 decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick,33 upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
which made sodomy, defined as "any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another," a criminal
act. 4 The respondent, a male homosexual, was initially charged with
violating the statute by conduct with another male performed in the
privacy of respondent's home. After the state declined prosecution,
respondent sought to declare the statute unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit reconduct condemned as criminal.
29.
30.

Id. at 22-23.
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975).

31.

Id. at 50.

32. Doe v. Commonwealth's-Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affig 903 F. Supp. 1199,
1202 (E.D. Va. 1975) (emphasizing the ancestry going back to Judaic and Christian law). The
D.C. Circuit, in a controversial opinion, held that Doe is controlling on lower federal courts.
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Eleventh Circuit, on the
other hand, reached a contrary conclusion, reasoning that a summary affirmance is not an
endorsement of the lower court's reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986).
33. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
34. Id. at 2842 n.l.
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versed on the ground that the statute interfered with respondent's
constitutionally protected right of sexual privacy.35
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice
White, reversed. Treating the case as presenting solely an issue of
due process, Justice White, speaking for Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rhenquist, and O'Connor, proclaimed that the Supreme Court was "quite unwilling" to announce "a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy.""6 To the majority, the
Court's prior decisions protecting married and unmarried sexual privacy should be limited to the specific conduct previously accorded
constitutional protection, viz, child rearing and education, family relationships, marriage, contraception, and abortion. "None of the
rights announced in those cases," the majority concluded, "bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy . .

.

Chief Justice Burger's concurrence underscored a similar but
somewhat stronger view - that "in constitutional terms there is no
such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy. "38
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented and criticized the majority's "almost obsessive focus
on homosexual activity"39 and it's "willful blindness" to the "fact
that sexual intimacy is a 'sensitive key relationship of human existence . .

'

"40

Chief Justice Burger's blunt, narrow, homophobic view stands
in marked contrast to the tolerance so movingly expressed by Justice
Blackmun's anguished dissent:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in
a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many 'right' ways of
conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has4 1 to
choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.
The traditional American unwillingness to perceive male homosexuals as entitled to constitutional protection has not been confined
35. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 1985).
36. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
37. Id. at 2843-44.
38. Id. at 2847.
39. Id. at 2849.
40. Id. at 2851 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
41. Id. (emphasis in the original).
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to the Supreme Court; indeed, it has been expressed by groups which
view their function as the protection of constitutional rights. While

the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is currently active in
efforts to protect gay AIDS victims,42 as recently as 1957, the Na-

tional Board of the American Civil Liberties
spond to the "occasional demands" made upon
the civil liberties of homosexuals." 43 Ironically,
the Civil Liberties Union reflects the current

Union refused to rethe Union to "defend
the past reasoning of
reasoning of the Su-

preme Court: 44 it is "not the function of the ACLU to evaluate the

social validity of laws aimed at the suppression or elimination of
homosexuals, and that overt acts of homosexuality constitute a com-

mon law felony."' 45 Since then, the ACLU, in the most recent Supreme Court case, has sought unsuccessfully to protect the constitu-

tional rights of homosexuals. 4" The major health problem posed by
AIDS, however, threatens to undermine attempts to protect the civil

rights of gays, particularly in light of the uncertain etiology of the
disease.

47

III.

AIDS

As A

DISEASE:

A

WORKING SUMMARY OF

CONTEMPORARY MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE

A.

Epidemiology

In June of 1981, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) issued
their first AIDS report, which described exceedingly rare opportunistic infections striking primarily in homosexual men in the Los Angeles area. 48 By September of 1982, the CDC recognized Acquired Im49
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as a new and distinct illness,
42. In April, 1986, the ACLU adopted a policy on AIDS which declared that the
"emergence of ... AIDS ... has serious implications for civil liberties such as control over
one's body, freedom of association and the right of privacy of one's medical records." ACLU,
Summary of Board Actions at April 12-13,1986 Meeting, at 7 (on file at Hofstra Law
Review).
43. ACLU, 37 ANNUAL REPORT 78 (July 1, 1956-June 30, 1957).
44. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
45. ACLU, supra note 43, at 78.
46. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (ACLU filed amicus petition for writ of certiorari).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 48-82.
48. Pneumocystis Pneumonia - Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 250 (June 5, 1981).
49. Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - United States, 31
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 507 (Sept. 24, 1982). The CDC defines AIDS as "a
reliably diagnosed disease that is at least moderately indicative of an underlying cellular immunodeficiency in a person who has no known underlying cause of cellular immunodeficiency
nor any other cause of reduced resistance reported to be associated with that disease." AIDS
Update 1983, supra note 13, at 310.
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and by 1983, identified additional high-risk groups: intravenous drug
users, Haitians, hemophiliacs, infants born to infected mothers and
recipients of transfused blood.50 By late 1985, the New York State
Department of Health concluded that sexually active homosexual
and bisexual men with multiple partners (73%) and present or past
abusers of intravenous drugs (17%) constituted the overwhelming
majority of AIDS victims."1
A daily average of eleven new AIDS cases is reported in the
United States, 52 and the total number of cases is expected to reach
40,000 by the end of 1986. 53 AIDS is a deadly disease. Although the
mortality rate (the proportion of deaths to the total number of reported cases) among AIDS patients to date is forty-seven percent,
the case fatality rate (the chance that a specific patient will die of
AIDS) is one hundred percent. 4 At present, no treatment exists
which is effective in either suppressing the multiplication of the
AIDS virus within an infected individual, or in reconstituting the
immune system once it has undergone breakdown.5 5 No vaccine has
50.

AIDS Update 1983, supra note 13, at 309-11.
N.Y. STATE DEP'T. OF HEALTH, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: 100
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 1 (1985). Scattered cases involved persons with hemophilia and others
who had received transfusions of contaminated blood or blood products (3%), non-at-risk persons who had had heterosexual contact with persons with AIDS or at risk for AIDS (1%), and
children who had apparently acquired AIDS prior to or during birth from infected mothers
(1%). Other victims, not falling into any identified risk groups, accounted for the remaining
5% of cases. Id. at 1-2.
52. Langer, Introduction, in AIDS LEGAL GUIDE: A PROFESSIONAL RESOURCE ON
AIDS-RELATED LEGAL ISSUES AND DISCRIMINATION 1 (Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc. 1984).
53. Krim, supra note 7, at 3. By September, 1985, 21 countries had reported 1,573
AIDS cases to the World Health Organization European Collaborating Centre on AIDS. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-Europe, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 35 (Jan. 24, 1986). The World Health Organization, in more recent estimates,
has suggested that 50,000 Africans may have contracted AIDS since 1980, and that one million to two million people may be symptomless carriers of the AIDS virus. U.N. Agency Says
There May Be 50,000 Cases of AIDS in Africa, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1986, at A18, col. 6. The
head of the AIDS branch of the CDC has characterized AIDS as "a massive problem, one
with national and international implications," Altman, New Fear on Drug Use and AIDS,
N.Y. Times, April 6, 1986, at Al, col. 2, while medical researchers caution that government
statistics on reported cases, may conservatively understate the number of cases. See Hunt,
Teaming Up Against AIDS N.Y. Times, March 2, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 42. A factor in
the underreporting of AIDS is the cooperation of health care workers, sympathetic to ill and
dying patients, in not labeling a patient with the ignominy of AIDS, with its attendant adverse
consequences. See King, Doctors Cite Stigma of AIDS In Declining to Report Cases, N.Y.
Times, May 27, 1986, at AI, col. 1.
54. Krim, supra note 7, at 6.
55. Id.

51.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss1/7

8

Orland and Wise: The AIDS Epidemic: A Constitutional Conundrum

1985]

A CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM

been developed to protect those not yet exposed to the AIDS virus. 6
B. Symptomology
The AIDS virus causes reduced cellular immunity; the virus affects one specific white blood cell type (T-lymphocyte) which normally attacks viruses, fungi, parasitic infections, and cancer. 7 As a
result of the breakdown in T-lymphocytes, the AIDS patient first
becomes unusually vulnerable to opportunistic infections which present a variety of symptoms identified as AIDS-related complex
(ARC); 8 later, as the disease progresses, the patient becomes debilitated by viral and fungal illnesses common in the general population,59 but deadly to the AIDS patient. Stricken patients usually die
within three years of diagnosis; there is no known cure. 0
C. Transmissibility
All evidence indicates that the virus associated with AIDS is
transmitted through direct blood-to-blood or semen-to-blood contact
- specifically sexual contact, needle sharing, or transfusion of blood
or blood products.61 Homosexual and bisexual men are at risk because of the prevalence in this group of anal and oral intercourse
which may result in semen-to-blood or blood-to-blood contact. 62 Any
direct contact with the semen of an infected person, including oral/
genital sex, increases the risk of AIDS transmission. 3 Communal
needle use among intravenous drug users obviously increases the risk
that blood from an infected person will be injected directly into the
bloodstream through the shared contaminated needle.6 4 Similarly,
hemophiliacs and others who receive blood transfusions may come
into direct contact with blood and blood products from infected
56. Researchers Say Laboratory Tests May Produce a Vaccinefor AIDS, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 1986, at 32, col. 1.
57. Bartlett, Refusal to Treat and HospitalLiability Issues, in AIDS: LEGAL ASPECTS
OF A MEDICAL CRISIS 3 (1985).
58. See J. SLAFF & J. BRUBAKER, supra note 9, at 271 (average life expectancy of the
AIDS patient is 18 months). ARC symptoms consist of chronic generalized enlargement of the
lymph nodes, recurrent fevers, weight loss, minor alterations in the immune system, and minor
infections. Id.
59. Grieco, Medical Facts Related to Legal Issues, in AIDS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF A
MEDICAL CRISIS 9, 12 (1985); Hunt, supra note 53, at 46.
60. J. SLAFF & J. BRUBAKER, supra note 9, at 7.
61. N.Y. STATE DEP'T. OF HEALTH, supra note 51, at 2.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 2.
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donors.65
One major uncertainty surrounding AIDS is whether or not the
virus can be transmitted through the day to day contact that occurs
in work, household, or school environments. Most scientists maintain
that such "casual" contact presents no risk of transmission of the
AIDS virus.6 6 Medical authorities who assert that AIDS cannot be
casually transmitted note that the AIDS virus does not survive long
outside the human body and is not transmitted through the air, food,
or water, nor is it transmitted by touching any object handled,
touched, or breathed on by an AIDS victim. 67 Moreover, family
studies indicate that adults do not transmit the infection to children,
except when infected mothers transmit AIDS to their unborn children.6 8 The available evidence also indicates that AIDS is not transmitted by eating and drinking from common dishes or utensils, or
69
other activities which are common to a household setting.
Even the CDC apparently has only speculative answers to critical questions about the cause, incubation period, and transmissibility
of AIDS. The possibility exists that body fluids other than blood,
blood products (such as plasma), and semen can carry the infectious
agent. The virus has been cultured from saliva and tears,7 0 and some
researchers have hypothesized that sweat may act as a transmission
agent.7 1 Obviously, this uncertainty on the part of the foremost medical experts contributes to the belief held by roughly half of all
Americans that the disease is communicable through casual
65. J. SLAFF & J. BRUBAKER, supra note 9, at 147. But new infection among
hemophiliacs and others who receive blood transfusions has been substantially eliminated
through screening of all blood donations since April 1985. Id.
66. Hunt, supra note 53, at 46.
67. N.Y. STATE DEP'T. OF HEALTH, supra note 51, at 4; Summary: Recommendations
for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III
Lymphadenopathy - Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 681, 681 (Nov. 15, 1985) (CDC does not recommend blood screening in the
workplace because "AIDS is a bloodborne, sexually transmitted disease that is not spread by
casual contact." CDC recommends that "food service workers known to be infected with
AIDS should not be restricted from work.") This issue is still the subject of exploration in the
medical community. A recent study indicates that the AIDS virus can remain active outside
the body for up to 15 days. Tests Show AIDS Virus Can Live Up to 15 Days Outside the
Body, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1986, at AI5, col. 5.
68. Grieco, supra note 59, at 12. One researcher has suggested that the "virus present in
the birth canal could be delivered to newborns during delivery." Altman, AIDS Study May
Show How Women Infect Men, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1986, at A16, col. 1.
69. N.Y. STATE DEP'T. OF HEALTH, supra note 51, at 4.
70. Grieco, supra note 59, at 11.
71. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 681, 685 (1985).
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contact.7 2
A similar mystery surrounds questions of the communicability
period attendant to the AIDS virus. CDC-defined AIDS occurs
when the number of T-lymphocytes is reduced to a level where certain opportunistic infections associated with the disease occur." It is
altogether possible, however, that a carrier might transmit the AIDS
virus at a number of different disease stages. The CDC recognized
that two to twenty-four months may elapse between exposure to the
AIDS virus and the appearance of recognizable symptoms, and that
transmissibility may precede recognizable illness.74 One observer has
suggested four categories of infected AIDS individuals: (1) those exposed to the virus (or who test positively for the presence of the
AIDS antibody in their blood) who display no physical symptoms;
(2) those exposed persons with symptoms characteristic of the onset
of AIDS; (3) those suffering from an opportunistic infection who do
not require hospitalization and are able to carry on their normal activities; and (4) those hospitalized as a result of multiple infections
or so weakened by their condition that they are relatively
75
incapacitated.
The shroud of uncertainty surrounding AIDS transmission and
communicability during all disease stages has dark and depressing
social and legal implications.7 6 This is particularly true because the
CDC has recognized that persons who exhibit no symptoms or who
are not, and do not become, ill with CDC-defined AIDS, may nevertheless be carriers of the infection. 77 There is the additional possibility that individuals who exhibit warning signs associated with AIDS,
including swollen lymph nodes, weight loss, abnormal fatigue, night
sweats, and a decrease in T-lymphocytes in the blood, may transmit
72. Silas, Is School for All?, 71 A.B.A. J. 18 (Nov. 1985).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59. See also Sicklick and Rubinstein, A
Medical Review of AIDS, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 5, 6 (1985) (discussing case definition of
AIDS).
74. Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Report of InterAgency Recommendations, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 101, 102 (Mar. 4,
1983).
75. Leonard, supra note 71, at 687 (citing Mathew J. Shebar, legal services director of
Gay Men's Health Crisis, Inc.; categories discussed in the context of suitability for employment). See also Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
11, 20 (1985) (updating suggested categories of AIDS patients).
76. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 71, at 687 (discussing discrimination in the workplace
experienced by members of each category).
77. Immunodeficiency among Female Sexual Partnersof Males with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - New York, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 69798 (Jan. 7, 1983).
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the infectious agent.7 8 However, these symptoms can be attributable
to medical conditions other than AIDS; the presence of ARC symptoms does not mean that the infected individual will himself develop
AIDS. 79 Furthermore, a positive AIDS antibody test neither accurately predicts development of AIDS, nor does it predict the risk of
transmission. 0 At present, the CDC concludes that the transmission
of AIDS by casual contact or airborne spread is a minimal risk of
the disease."'
IV.

AIDS As A PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

AIDS, if not presently epidemic in scope, may well take on epidemic proportions if no public health measures reduce its occurrence
and spread.82 Responsible authorities estimate that presently there
may be hundreds of thousands of AIDS cases; these estimates push
toward one million at the high end of the spectrum. All authorities
agree that the reported AIDS case rate is rising dramatically each
year. 83 The Acting Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services has spoken of an "escalating AIDS epidemic" of "staggering
and devastating" proportions, while the Public Health Service has
predicted 270,000 AIDS cases and 179,000 AIDS deaths by 1991.4
Undoubtedly, this threat of mass death will weaken the resolve of
even the most vigorous defenders of individual rights, including defenders of the rights of the largest group affected by AIDS - gay
men.
Opponents of homosexual rights have used the AIDS issue as a
"lightning rod" to inflame preexisting prejudice against gay men.8 5
78. Leonard, supra note 71, at 685.
79. Id.
80. Antibodies to a Retrovirus Etiologically Associated with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in Populations with Increased Incidences of the Syndrome, 33
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 377, 378 (July 13, 1984).
81. AIDS Update 1983, supra note 13, at 311 (no evidence suggests transmission of
AIDS by airborne spread; casual contact offers little or no risk).
82. Relman, Introduction, in AIDS: THE EMERGING ETHICAL DILEMMAS, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 1 (special supplement); Hunt, supra note 53.
83. Address of Dr. Mathilde Krim, Yale Law School AIDS Conference (Feb. 1, 1986)
(on file at Hofstra Law Review). See also supra note 53. (World Health Organization reports
AIDS cases in 21 European countries); AIDS Update 1986, supra note 13, at 17 (the number
of AIDS cases in the U.S. continues to increase, although not exponentially); Simons, Brazil
Surveys Carnival Visitors About AIDS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at 9, col. 1 (Brazilian
health authorities report 574 AIDS cases, more than half of which resulted in deaths).
84. Pear, Tenfold Increase in AIDS Death Toll is Expected by '91, N.Y. Times, June
13, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
85. D. ALTMAN, supra note 10, at 69-70.
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This prejudice, combined with genuine concern over the proportions
of the threat involved, has led to the firing of homosexuals from their
jobs, outright physical assaults upon gays, and pressure on state officials to reopen a former leper colony to confine AIDS carriers.86
Many supporters of repressive measures presumably share the view
of Ronald Goodwin of the Moral Majority, who sees any attempt to
cure or prevent AIDS as "a commitment to spend our tax dollars on
perresearch to allow these diseased homosexuals to go back to'8 their
7
verted practices without any standards of accountability.
Even reactions free of antihomosexual bias may not rest on a
rational basis. Public school boards, for example, have been reluctant
to admit children suffering from AIDS into classrooms; 8 obviously,
these child victims are not objects of prejudice apart from their diseased state. While these responses may be efforts to balance the
rights of AIDS-infected students to an education against the right of
the other students to be free from a public health risk, such responses also represent a hysterical social reaction, unrelated to the
reality of the underlying risk.
These kinds of responses present the core question of where,
given the current state of medical knowledge, the balance should be
struck between the rights of AIDS victims and the threat to public
safety. This process generates the further question of whether or not,
if AIDS were found to be transmissible through casual contact or
airborne exposure, there are any limits on the measures which could
be taken to protect the public from contagion.
The uncertain state of medical and scientific knowledge concerning the transmissibility of AIDS complicates constitutional analysis of a situation in which an AIDS victim, either actual or suspected, makes contact with other members of the public. The risk of
death associated with AIDS is serious. If that risk threatens a large
enough segment of the population, and if there is certainty about the
few limits on State activithreat of death, then, arguably, there are
89
ties undertaken to minimize that risk.
86. Id. at 60-65.
87.

Id. at 25 (quoting Ronald Goodwin). Similar views have been expressed by high

officials in the Reagan Administration. Patrick Buchanan, White House Director of Communications, has declared that homosexuals "have declared war upon Nature, and now Nature is

exacting an awful retribution'." Bayer, AIDS and the Gay Community: Between the Specter
and the Promise of Medicine, 52 Soc. RESEARCH 581, 589 (1985) (quoting Buchanan as re-

ported in N.Y. Post, May 24, 1983).
88.
89.

Silas, supra note 72, at 18.
Contra Address of G. Calabresi, Yale Law School AIDS Conference (Feb. 1, 1986)
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Nevertheless, constitutional limits on state action do not simply
evaporate in the midst of crisis, no matter how serious the threatened
risk. While the control of disease is an area traditionally within the
state's police power, 90 there are, nonetheless, constitutional limits on
the state's ability to use criminal law to control disease. The state

cannot, for example, make illness a crime,9 ' although it can make
public acts committed by an ill person criminal. 92 It appears unlikely
that the state can constitutionally impose criminal sanctions on a
person having the status of an AIDS carrier, 93 even though the state

may constitutionally punish public and perhaps even private
acts by
94
AIDS carriers if those acts carry high risks to the public.
Forty years ago, in Korematsu v. United States,9 the United

States Supreme Court, in one of its unhappier moments, 96 upheld on
national security grounds the confinement of citizens of Japanese ancestry in internment centers.9 If an exclusion order against citizens
based on race or national origin can be sustained on national security
(on file at Hofstra Law Review); G. CALABRESI; IDEALS, BELIEFS. ATTITUDES AND THE LAW
101-05 (1985) (arguing that even the risk of death should not justify state discrimination
against those who have been victims of discrimination).
90. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (sustaining statute compelling vaccination for smallpox because the police power of a state includes reasonable regulations to
protect the public health and safety).
91. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (invalidating statute that
criminalized being a drug addict, noting that narcotic addiction is an illness, and holding that
a statute imprisoning a person thus inflicted is unconstitutional; also noting that '.[e]ven one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common
cold").
92. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of a chronic alcoholic's conviction for public drunkenness where the prohibited act was public intoxication
rather than the status of being an alcoholic).
93. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). See also Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939) (invalidating statute which made membership in a gang criminal).
94. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). The constitutional ability of the state to
punish sexual acts by AIDS carriers, even in the privacy of the home, has been vastly enhanced by the Supreme Court opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986). See
Infra note 106. See also, Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine,
14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53, (1985) (discussing history of quarantine, applying the law of quarantine to AIDS, and addressing the constitutional and regulatory implication of an AIDS
quarantine).
95. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
96. Justices Roberts, Murphy and Jackson each wrote eloquent dissents, see id. at 22548, and Mr. Korematsu was ultimately vindicated. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.
Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting coram nobis).
97. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court declared: "Regardless
of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers - and we deem it unjustifiable to
call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies - we are
dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order." Id. at 223.
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grounds (characterized by the Korematsu Court as an example of
"pressing public necessity"), 98 can we say with any certainty that the
Supreme Court would strike down the long-term confinement of, for
example, all black males, if, contrary to current known fact, black
males were, with reasonable certainty, identified as high-risk carriers
of AIDS? Would the result be any different if the risk group were
aliens, such as Haitians?99 What if the risk group were Jews and the
proposed governmental response was to intern all American Jews
who test positive, in Korematsu-style "assembly and relocation centers," until they are no longer infectious (which may mean when
they are dead)?
Yale Law School Dean Guido Calabresi has suggested that, in
an ideal society, if the object of state action is a group which has
already been the subject of discrimination, then even the objective of
preventing death may not constitute sufficient justification for class
based discriminatory actions. 100 Several factors dampen the likelihood that the rational and humane Calabresi position will benefit
those grappling to protect the constitutional rights of AIDS victims.
In America's real and far from ideal society, the legacy of oppression against gay men is one historically grounded in law and,
even today, based on law. 10 Moreover, gay men, under current equal
protection doctrine, have not been recognized as a suspect class, 102
(which would require that class-effecting legislation survive the test
of strict constitutional scrutiny). As of this writing, it is highly unlikely that either discriminating against gay men or imposing criminal sanctions on gay men for homosexual conduct is unconstitu04
tional.103 In Bowers v. Hardwick,1
the Supreme Court upheld the
98. Id. at 216.
99. The Public Health Service has proposed barring immigration of aliens with AIDS.
See Pear, Federal Government Seeks to Bar Entry of Aliens Who Have AIDS, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 24, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
100. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 89, at 102-09.
I01. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of sodomy statute
as applied to private homosexual conduct in the privacy of the home). Cf. D. BELL, RACE AND
AMERICAN LAW

(1973) (tracing America's historical constitutional and legal legacy of oppres-

sion of blacks).
102. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979) (homosex-

uals have not been designated a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class requiring stricter scrutiny
of classifications on the basis of homosexuality). See also Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,

403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (right of privacy does not
include private homosexual conduct).

103.

The D.C. Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit reached opposite conclusions regarding

the test to be applied in appraising constitutional rights of gay men and the deference to be
accorded the Supreme Court per curiam affirmance order in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
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authority of the state to impose criminal sanctions for acts of oral
and anal intercourse committed in the privacy of the home; the majority rested its decision on the validity of the "presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable,"'' 05 rather than on the issue of a public
health justification for the legislation. 106 While the public health issue had been tendered by Georgia in the district court, the Supreme

Court majority, in holding that private acts of homosexual conduct
were not constitutionally protected, did not find it necessary to consider this argument.
The majority opinion in Bowers characterized the case as
presenting only a due process challenge to a criminal statute. Accordingly, the majority did not consider claims under the eighth and
ninth amendments or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth

amendment. The dissenters, however, criticized the Court's
"cramped reading of the issue before it' ' x0 7 and viewed the case as
fairly presenting broader constitutional claims. The hostility of the
majority to gay male constitutional claims, hostility which the disney, 425

U.S. 901 (1976). The D.C. Circuit considered Doe controlling and concluded that the
Navy's policy of mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct does not violate constitutional
rights to privacy or equal protection. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391-92, reh'g en
banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Eleventh Circuit held that Doe was not
controlling and struck down Georgia's sodomy law as violative of constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1Ith Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 2841 (1986). The Fifth Circuit, in Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (1985), agreed with the
D.C. Circuit in Dronenburgand held that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe is
binding on the Court of Appeals, and that a Texas statute proscribing deviate sexual intercourse with an individual of the same sex did not deprive homosexuals of equal protection. See
Infra text accompanying note 120. Commentaries have urged that gays are entitled to constitutional privacy and equal protection guarantees. See Richards, Homosexuality and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 8 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 311, 313-14 (1979); Note, The
Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1278 (1986); Note, The
Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,98
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1297-1305 (1985); Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal
Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 797, 816-36 (1984).
On June 30, 1986, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of the precedential significance
of the prior decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). The Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit and stated, somewhat enigmatically, "we prefer to give plenary consideration
to the merits of this case rather than rely on our earlier decision in Doe." Id. at 2843 n.4.
104. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
105. Id. at 2846.
106. Id. at 2853. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, noted the failure of the majority to
deal with the public/private distinction: "But the mere fact that intimate behavior may be
punished when it takes place in public cannot dictate how States can regulate intimate behavior that occurs in intimate places." Id. at 2855.
107. Id. at 2850.
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senters characterized as an "almost obsessive focus on homosexual
activity,"108 and which cast prior sexual privacy cases in an exceedingly narrow light, 109 makes it unlikely that the present Court would,
in future cases, find constitutional protection for gay men based on
any constitutional amendment or any theory of unconstitutionality
other than cruel and unusual punishment.110
The Supreme Court has already concluded that the constitutional right to privacy does not preclude imposition of criminal sanctions on consensual homosexual conduct in the privacy of the
home. 11 That ruling substantially enhances the power of the state to
control deadly sexually transmitted disease in the midst of a public
health crisis, particularly in a federalist framework which historically has accorded great deference to state and local health measures.11 2 Thus, the AIDS problem tests the constitutioanl outer limits
of state control of life-threatening disease.
The need to strike a balance between the rights of gay men afflicted with AIDS and the state's interest in protecting the public
from the spread of AIDS presents complex constitutional issues illustrated by the following problems:
Can those who claim that gay men are the subjects of discrimination in violation of equal protection overcome the case law sug-3
11
gesting that being male or gay is neither a suspect classification,
nor a quasi-suspect classification;11 4 the further justification that the
restriction was aimed at disease carriers, not persons with a particular sexual preference; 1 5 and the Supreme Court decision in Bowers
108. Id. at 2849.
109. See id. at 2850-51.
110. The eighth amendment issue was seen as an open one by the four dissenters as well
as Justice Powell. Justice Powell's concurring opinion specifically reserved judgment on the
eighth amendment question: "The Georgia statute at issue in this case. . . authorizes a court
to imprison a person for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of sodomy. In my
view, a prison sentence for such conduct - certainly a sentence of long duration - would
create a serious Eighth Amendment issue." Id. at 2847.
111. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
112. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
113. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
114. Cf. Note, The ConstitutionalRights of AIDS Carriers,99 HARV. L. REv. 1274,
1278 (1986) (discussing the standard of intermediate scrutiny).
115. A major obstacle to a challenge by homosexuals of AIDS-related regulations on
equal protection grounds is the fact that, even if homosexuals were found to constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, most of these regulations would be aimed at the larger class of
disease carriers, rather than at the smaller class of persons with a particular sexual preference.
Although the impact of such a regulation would clearly fall most heavily upon homosexuals
and bisexuals, discriminatory impact, standing alone, may be insufficient to establish a viola-
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sustaining the constitutionality of a sodomy statute applied to male

116
homosexual conduct in the privacy of the home?
Does the claim that gay men have a right to freedom of association,117 even if recognized, evaporate in light of a reasonable legislative finding that gay bathhouses are a public health menace because
they increase the probability of transmission of a deadly disease? 1 8
Does anything remain of the claim that restrictive AIDS legislation conflicts with the right of sexual privacy,11 9 given the explicit
refusal of the Supreme Court in Bowers to extend the married or
unmarried sexual privacy doctrine from the heterosexual relationship

to the homosexual one? 120

Can states, as a preventive measure, routinely inspect hotels
21
where unsafe sexual activity linked to AIDS is said to take place?
If specific hotels are linked to sexual encounters by gay men, can the
hotel rooms be searched without violating the fourth amendment? 22
tion of equal protection, absent discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (zoning ordinance upheld against challenge
that its effect was racially disproportionate, absent a showing of discriminatory intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding written objective test as criterion for government employment against challenge that a disproportionate number of blacks failed the test).
116. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
117. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (due process right
of freedom of association violated by requiring an organization to give membership lists to the
state).
118. In People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983),
cert. dismissed sub nom. New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984), the New York Court
of Appeals invalidated, on federal constitutional grounds, a state statute prohibiting persons
from loitering "in a public place for the purpose of engaging, or soliciting another person to
engage, in deviate sexual intercourse or other sexual behavior of a deviate nature." Id. at 937,
447 N.E.2d at 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515. After initially granting certiorari, New York v.
Uplinger, 464 U.S. 812 (1983), the Supreme Court dismissed the writ as "improvidently
granted," 104 S. Ct. 2332, 2333 (1984). The per curiam order stated, enigmatically, that the
case presented an "inappropriate vehicle for resolving the important constitutional issues raised
by the parties." Id. at 2334. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, dissented on the ground that the "New York statute was invalidated on
federal constitutional grounds, and the merits of that decision are properly before us and
should be addressed." Id. at 2335. Justice Stevens, concurring, declared: "If a majority is
convinced after studying the case that its posture . . . makes it an unwise vehicle for exercising the 'gravest and most delicate' function that this Court is called upon to perform, the Rule
of Four should not reach so far as to compel the majority to decide the case." Id.
119. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. 106 S.Ct. at 2846.
121. Axelrod Says Hotels Are Subject To Curbs on Sex Linked to AIDS, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1985, at B4, col. 4.
122. Cf. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (sustaining warrantless mine safety
inspection, based on substantial federal regulatory presence); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978) (invalidating warrantless federal OSHA inspections); Camara v. Municipal
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Can the state close a gay bar by calling it "an establishment

where sexual practices that can transmit AIDS [are] believed to
take place,"1 23 given the deference accorded state action
over liquor
124
establishments under the twenty-first amendment?

Apart from statutory rights dealing with the right of a patient
to hospital12 5 or medical treatment, 126 does the refusal of public hos-

pitals to accept an AIDS patient for treatment generate constitutional problems under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
127

amendment?
Can a health or life insurer lawfully 2 8 refuse to insure a person
who tests positive on a blood test or who refuses to be tested, when

the reliability of the antibody test is still questionable? 2 9
Is employment discrimination against gay men, or those who
test positive, an unconstitutional response to the fear, hysteria, and
prejudice that surround the AIDS issue, 3 0 and does such employCourt, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (requiring warrant for routine "housing" inspections); See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (invalidating warrantless federal inspection of commercial
premises). See also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home visitation as part of AFDC
program is not an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy). See generally 1 W. LAFAVE AND
J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9 (1984) (discussing inspection and regulatory searches).
123. Purnick, City Seeks to Close AIDS-Risk Place, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1985, at B5,
col. 4.
124. See N.Y. State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (sustaining restriction on topless dancing in bar).
125. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-b(1), (2) (McKinney 1985). A hospital that
fails to comply with the New York statute requiring admission of patients may have its operating certificate revoked. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2806 (McKinney 1985).
126. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-b(2)(b) (McKinney 1985).
127. In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the Court invalidated a statutory requirement of a year's residency in a county as a condition to an indigent's
receiving free nonemergency hospitalization or medical care. In invalidating the statutory requirement, the Court relied upon Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Both Memorial
Hospitaland Shapiro involved the constitutionally fundamental right to travel, and considered
the deprivation of important benefits as penalties upon the right to travel, rather than holding
the benefits fundamental in and of themselves.
128. See generally Scherzer, AIDS and Insurance - Problems and Approaches Under
N.Y. Law, in AIDS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF A MEDICAL CRISIS 126, 128 (1985) (some states have
statutorily or administratively prohibited the use of antibody tests for insurance purposes).
129. See generally Eckholm, Screeningof Blood for AIDS Raises Civil LibertiesIssues,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 2. The simplest testing procedure often registers positive when no disease-indicating antibody is present. Hence, for diagnostic purposes, two simple
tests, followed by a more complex test, are usually administered. Id. at B8, Col. 4.
130. The Supreme Court has refused to allow classification on the basis of public
prejudice. For example, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984), which involved a child
custody case in which a divorced white mother had remarried a black man, the lower courts
transferred custody of the daughter to the natural father, who was white, on the grounds that
if the child remained with her mother and stepfather, she would be "vulnerable to peer pres-
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ment discrimination violate equal protection or Title VII? 131 Can the
discrimination nonetheless be justified as a response to identifiable
public health concerns 32 and the need to provide a safe work environment for other workers?
Does discrimination against AIDS victims in jobs, services or
benefits by federal agencies, or recipients of federal funds, constitute
discrimination against the handicapped under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973?133
This essay can do little more than identify constitutional
problems raised by the threat of AIDS and suggest constitutional
approaches, necessarily limited, for resolution of issues. Perhaps additional insight may be gained by examination of responses to AIDS
in a microcosm of society, the prison.
sures [and] suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come." Id. at 1881. The Supreme Court, finding that the lower court's order could not survive strict scrutiny, unanimously
reversed. The Court acknowledged that the private prejudices on which the state court had
relied were probably real ones, but held that the law may not, directly or indirectly, tolerate
such private prejudices. Id. at 1882.
131. In DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (1979), homosexuals
were not considered to be a "class" within the meaning of thd Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3). The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[h]omosexuals do not comprise a group which
federal statutory or constitutional law deems in need of protection from group harassment,
hence, [they] do not constitute a protected class for purposes of § 1985." Id. at 334 n.1. The
court also held that the ban against employment discrimination contained in Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e does not protect homosexuals from employment discrimination, because Title
VII's prohibition of "sex" discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender,
rather than on the basis of sexual preference. Id. at 329-30. Accord Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436
F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977) and Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977) (both holding that Title VII does not reach discrimination against transsexuals).
132. See supra note I II and accompanying text. But see G. CALABRES, supra note 89,
at 106-09.
133. Lawyers of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, in a confidential
staff legal opinion, answered this question affirmatively:
Because of public hysteria connected with the disease, persons with AIDS frequently become societal pariahs, irrationally ostracized by their communities because of medically baseless fears of contagion, and people's historical fear of both
disease and the sick . .

.

.This treatment of persons with AIDS, grounded in irra-

tional public prejudices, is precisely one of the kinds of behaviors that led to the
enactment of the Rehabilitation Act.
Pear, AIDS Victims Gain In Fight On Rights, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, at Al, col. 5. This
position was ultimately rejected by the Justice Department. For an in-depth analysis of the
memorandum written by Assistant Attorney General Cooper, see Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW II, 29-34 (1985). A majority of states,
however, have rejected the Justice Department position and have declared that AIDS is a
handicap under state laws. See Pear, States' AIDS DiscriminationLaws Reject Justice Department's Stand, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at A20, col. 1.
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V.

PRISONERS, JAIL INMATES, AND AIDS

Toward the end of 1985, the National Institute of Justice and
the American Correctional Association attempted to ascertain the
13 4
number of confirmed AIDS cases in America's prisons and jails.
The survey disclosed 455 confirmed AIDS cases in twenty-five state
and federal correctional systems and 310 cases in nineteen city or
county jail systems. 13 5 Undoubtedly the number of actual cases of
AIDS in the prison and jail population is now significantly higher.' 3 6
The competing demands facing a correctional administrator seeking
to deal rationally with AIDS are substantial and reflect the demands
placed on other public officials.' 3 7 Consider the following hypothetical problems:
Some incoming inmates demand, as a constitutional right, to be
blood tested for AIDS antibodies; other incoming inmates assert, as
a matter of privacy, the right not to be tested.
Some inmates either tested positive for AIDS antibodies or diagnosed as having active ARC or AIDS demand transfer to a hospital, while other inmates, similarly situated, assert a right not to be
transferred. Alternatively, some infected inmates ask for isolation
and treatment in the prison hospital, while others demand not to be
transferred to the prison hospital and demand expensive or experimental life-saving treatment.
Some inmates who test positive for AIDS antibodies assert the
right not to be removed from the general prison population, while
others have no objection to being placed in administrative segregation.' 38 Other inmates, not tested positive, demand that the correc134. Pear, Guide on AIDS Urges Surgeons To Use Caution,N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1986,
at A10, col. 1.
135. Id.
136. See generally Altman, New Fear on Drug Use and AIDS, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6,
1986, at Al, col. 2 (noting that AIDS is the leading cause of death in New York prisons, and
probably elsewhere, principally because of intravenous drug use before incarceration and suggesting that such use will cause a rapid increase in AIDS cases in prisons).
137. One of the coauthors of this essay has served as Correctional Practices Consultant
to the Connecticut Commissioner of Corrections for more than a decade. See generally L.
ORLAND, PRISONs: HousEs OF DARKNESS 81-108 (1975) (discussing conflicting rights of prisoners under the law). The other coauthor has been counsel in a number of constitutional attacks on practices of the Connecticut Commissioner of Corrections. See, e.g., Bell v. Manson,
590 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1978). This analysis is not intended to reflect actual current problems
or policies in the Connecticut correctional system, but draws upon the authors' collective experience to explore general correctional issues. For a discussion of AIDS in Connecticut prisons,
see Gordon, Prisons Alter AIDS-Complex Policy, Hartford Courant, March 5, 1986, at Al,
col. I.
138. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 463 n.1 (1983) (distinguishing between discipli-
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tional system protect their health by removal of those inmates who
test positive to administrative segregation, the prison hospital, or a
separate hospital.
Some AIDS-positive tested inmates demand the right to continue in their current sentence-reducing job assignments, including
food handling, while other inmates, as well as many correctional officers and their union representatives, demand that positively tested
inmates not handle food. Many correctional officers and their union
representatives demand that inmates who test positive be removed
from the population, placed in administrative segregation, placed in
a prison hospital, or removed altogether from the correctional system
so that correctional officers will not risk contagion.
It is fairly clear that a rational correctional commissioner cannot accommodate all of these demands, and that the Bill of Rights
will not provide the necessary guidance.189 Two immediate constitutional concerns are implicated. The initial constitutional problem is
the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment 140 as it
applies to a refusal to treat AIDS-infected inmates. The Supreme
Court made clear in Estelle v. Gamble 4 ' that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . . pr6scribed by the Eighth

Amendment.' '1 42 Applying Estelle, the Second Circuit, in Lareau v.
Manson, 43 held that failure to screen newly arrived inmates for
communicable disease adequately was "sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."' 4 While
subsequent cases make clear that the Constitution does not protect
inmates from the mere negligent infliction of injury,145 it seems safe
to conclude that, as to sentenced inmates, the state has a constitutional duty to screen for AIDS and to provide medical treatment for
known victims. Whether the same conclusion applies to pretrial denary segregation, confinement used when an inmate has committed a misconduct violation, and
administrative segregation, confinement imposed for security or protective reasons). See gener-

ally L. ORLAND, supra note 137, at 74 (describing "'punitive segregation' 139.

the hole").

See generally L. ORLAND, supra note 137, at 95-105 (describing inmate rights pro-

tected under the Bill of Rights).
140.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
141. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 104.
651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 109.
See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986) (protections of due process

not infringed by negligent failure of prison officials to protect inmate from injury).
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tainees is less clear in light of the Supreme Court's reluctance to
apply eighth amendment protection to jail inmates. 40
A second cluster of problems concerns transfer and isolation of
incarcerated AIDS victims. The Supreme Court has made clear that
due process does not require that inmates receive a hearing before
being transferred within a correctional system. 147 Nor has the Court
required a hearing before a correctional institution places an inmate
in administrative segregation. 48 On the other hand, in Vitek v.
Jones,1 49 the Court required a due process hearing before an inmate
was transferred from a correctional institution to a mental hospital.150 Arguably, under Vitek, a due process hearing would be required before transfer of an inmate to a separate AIDS hospital,
even though such a hearing would not be required for administrative
transfer of AIDS victims in administrative segregation within the
confines of a correctional institution. 51
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN

CONTROLLING STATE RESPONSES To AIDS

Americans, with justifiable pride, can point to the constitutional
protections of the Bill of Rights which have been used by the Supreme Court, frequently over popular opposition, to protect the despised and the disadvantaged, including the poor,152 the mentally
146. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (rejecting claim that double
ceiling and strip searches violate eighth amendment).
147. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (transfer to another correctional institution); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (transfer to maximum security institution);
Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 (1981) (transfer from state to federal institution).
148. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
149. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
150. Id.
151. Proposed guidelines for treatment of inmates, circulated for comment by the Centers for Disease Control in January 1986, do not recommend routine testing of inmates' blood
unless the correctional system is prepared to provide "totally separate" facilities for asymptomatic inmates who test positive. CDC notes that "relatively few prisons" are currently able
to provide such facilities. Pear, supra note 134.
152. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating divorce filing
fees as denying due process to indigents); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (invalidating
statute requiring imprisonment of indigents who cannot pay fines as denying equal protection);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (states must provide counsel for an indigent defendant's first appeal of a criminal conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (states
must furnish indigent criminal defendants with a free trial transcript when necessary for appeal of conviction).
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ill,' 5 3 the prisoner, 54 the alien, 55 those accused of crime,156 the illegitimate, 57 and racial minorities. 58 Unfortunately, this process has,
on occasion, led to unrealistic expectations and concomitant disillu-

sion when the Supreme Court has refused to extend constitutional

protection or to recognize the rights of a given group, 59 including,
most particularly, male homosexuals. Prisoners have certainly discovered the limits of civil rights protection. 16 0 Similar limits may be

found in Supreme Court consideration of the constitutional rights of
other disadvantaged groups.'' The stark truth is that the protections
of the Bill of Rights cannot solve all, or even most, problems of pov153. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahbma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) (indigent defendant must be
provided with psychiatric access if sanity will be a significant factor at trial); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480 (1980) (a convicted felon is entitled to appropriate procedures before being involuntarily subjected to institutional care in a mental hospital).
154. See generally L. ORLAND, supra note 137, at 81-108 (describing cases in which the
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional rights of prisoners).
155. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute denying
free public education to illegal alien children as a violation of equal protection); Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down civil service regulation barring resident
aliens from competitive civil service employment as denying due process); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (states may not bar resident aliens from state civil service
employment).
156. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1984) (survey of
rights of those accused of crime).
157. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (two year statute of limitations for
paternity suits violates equal protection); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (striking
down statute requiring paternity suit to be filed prior to child's first birthday); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down statute preventing illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (invalidating a statute
denying illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother).
158, See. e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (both holding that local school boards have affirmative duty to eradicate the effects of a system of segregation); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377
U.S. 218 (1964) (state may not close public schools for the unconstitutional purpose of segregation); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting "separate but equal" doctrine
for purposes of public education).
Gay men are conspicuously absent from the list of disadvantaged who have received protection from the Supreme Court.
159. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (sustaining use of Medicaid funds for
childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions); Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding
that states do not have to provide counsel to indigent defendants for the appeal process); Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding property tax exemption for widows, but not widowers); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (rejecting contention that the need for decent
shelter is a fundamental interest and upholding a statute which permits a landlord to bring an
expedited action for possession under certain circumstances).
160. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (refusing to extend eighth
amendment protection to pretrial jail inmates); Jones v. North Carolina Labor Union, 433
U.S. 119 (1977) (sustaining ban on prisoner's union).
161. See supra note 159.
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erty, prejudice, or injustice.
That lesson emerges with painful clarity as the Bill of Rights
fails as a primary safeguard against draconian state responses to
AIDS victims. State responses ostensibly based on quite rational
public health concerns are also the result of deeply rooted prejudice
against gay men.1 6 2 The probability of substantial constitutional protection for this group is slim, given the seriousness of the public
health risks, the traditional deference accorded state action in the

area of police power and public health, 6 3 and the frequency with
which the Supreme Court has rejected constitutional attacks on

criminal statutes directly aimed at gay men. 64
In the last analysis, the primary protections, given present judicial attitudes, derive not from law but from medicine, not from constitutional command, but from enlightened legislative and governmental self-interest, not from judicial leadership, but from the
tolerance of citizens. Indeed, the response of the medical profession
to the acute needs of AIDS-infected gay males stands in marked

contrast to the callous indifference thus far displayed by the judiciary. While the medical and scientific communities withhold moral
judgments and strain to search for cause, treatment, and cure, 1 5 the
judiciary, giving full sway to the moral tyranny of the majority, 66
permits state legislatures to impose criminal sanctions on those who

are stripped of constitutional protection merely because they differently "define themselves through their intimate sexual relationships
162. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
163. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). "According to settled principles, the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public
safety." Id. at 25.
164. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
165. See Hunt, supra note 53, at 42.

166. See J.S.

MILL, ON LIBERTY

89-90 (1951):

The will of. . .the majority. . . may desire to oppress a part of their number; and
precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power.
The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of
its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest part therein. This view of things. . . has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations "the tyranny of the majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be
on its guard. . . .Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not
enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and
feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them
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with others. 167 In Justice Blackmun's haunting words, "[D]epriving
individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their
intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do."' 168 Ultimately, depriving AIDS victims of legal
and constitutional protection may prove far more destructive to our
national conscience than any physical danger the AIDS epidemic
presents to the nation's citizens.

167.
168.

See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2856.
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